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ABSTRACT
Developments  since  the  introduction  of  the  1988  Βasel  Capital  Accord  have  resulted  in 
growing realisation that new forms of risks have emerged and that previously existing and 
managed forms require further redress. The revised Capital Accord, Basel II, evolved to a 
form of meta regulation – a type of regulation which involves the risk management of internal 
risks within firms.
The 1988 Basel Accord was adopted as a means of achieving two primary objectives: Firstly, 
“…to help strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system – this 
being facilitated where international banking organisations were encouraged to supplement 
their capital positions; and secondly, to mitigate competitive inequalities.”
As well as briefly outlining various efforts and measures which have been undertaken and 
adopted by several bodies in response to the recent Financial Crisis, this paper considers why 
efforts aimed at developing a new framework, namely, Basel III, have been undertaken and 
global  developments  which  have promulgated  the need  for  such a  framework.  Further,  it 
attempts  to  evaluate  the strengths  and flaws inherent  in  the present  and future regulatory 
frameworks by drawing a comparison between Basel II and the enhanced framework which 
will eventually be referred to as Basel III.
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losses; forward looking provisions; silent participations; Basel III
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Basel III and Responding to the Recent Financial Crisis: Progress made by 
the Basel Committee in relation to the Need for Increased Bank Capital 
and Increased Quality of Loss Absorbing Capital
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction
The  aftermath  of  the  2008  Financial  Crisis  (which  commenced  in  2007),  has  witnessed 
several reforms aimed at facilitating the introduction of legislation relating to higher levels in 
the quality and quantity of capital which banks are (and will be) required to retain. After it 
had been discovered that the global crisis had been partly triggered and aggravated as a result 
of :
Insufficient level of capital and inadequate level of quality capital and;
The need to provide for a definition of capital which would facilitate the absorption of 
losses (by regulatory instruments) on going and gone concern bases,
the implementation of an “enhanced Basel II” framework, which is aimed at consolidating on 
the efforts achieved through Basel II, and which attempts to realise such an aim by drawing 
on the lessons learned from the Financial Crisis, is approaching its realisation date.
Weaknesses in Basel II - weaknesses which surfaced during the 2008 Financial Crisis, are 
reflected  through  the  features  of  the  improved  and  enhanced  framework  which  will  be 
referred to as Basel III. Flaws and gaps in Basel II are largely attributed to banks’ extremely 
sensitive internal credit risk models which have contributed to pro cyclicality. As well as the 
need  to  address  pro  cyclicality,  the  second major  issue  in  need  of  redress  relates  to  the 
quantity and quality of capital – both issues having surfaced during the Financial Crisis. From 
this  respect,  Basel  III  differs  from Basel  II  in  relation  to  capital  and  measures  aimed  at 
mitigating pro cyclicality. For these reasons, the enhanced framework (Basel III) incorporates 
elements of improved quality and quantity of capital, as well as conservation buffers, counter 
cyclical buffers and additional capital requirements for systemically relevant institutions.
This  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  As  well  as  providing  an  analysis  and  evaluation  of 
measures which have been adopted by the Basel Committee and other standard setting bodies 
as a response to the recent financial crisis, section one is aimed at providing an overview of 
what Basel III entails as well as a background to why such a framework is necessary.
Section two then provides a comparative analysis between Basel III and its predecessor, Basel 
II, by way of reference to certain features which distinguish both frameworks. Features such 
as Tier One Capital,  Capital Conservation Buffers, Counter cyclical Buffers and additional 
capital requirements which have been imposed on systemically relevant financial institutions 
will be considered within this respect. 
The third section will then highlight problems which have been identified in relation to Basel 
II  –  as  well  as  its  beneficial  attributes.  It  will  also seek to  justify  the  recent  efforts  and 
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decisions which have been approved by the Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision 
and which are directed at raising the level of global minimum capital standards. 
The final section will then evaluate the Basel III framework and will draw conclusions based 
on the apparent benefits and gaps which have (so far) been identified and are attributed to 
Basel III.
B. Basel III and Recent Efforts to Address Pro Cyclical Effects of Basel II
In response to the recent Financial Crisis and to the realisation that capital levels (which banks 
operated with) during the period of the Crisis were insufficient and also lacking in quality,2 
the Basel Committee responded by raising the quality of capital – as well as its level.3
Further consequences of the recent Basel reforms also include:4 
- A tightening of the definition of common equity
- Limitation of what qualifies as Tier 1 capital
- An introduction of a harmonised set of prudential filters
- The  enhancement  of  transparency  and  market  discipline  through  new  disclosure 
requirements.”
The introduction of Basel II resulted in changes being made to the 1988 Basel Capital Accord 
to provide for a choice of three broad approaches to credit risk.5 This was introduced into 
Basel II in view of the realisation that “the optimal balance may differ significantly across 
banks.”6 The increased focus on risk (and particularly  credit  risk),  resulted  from growing 
realisation of the importance of risk within the financial sector. The range of approaches to 
credit risk – as introduced under Basel II, and which also exists for market risk, consists of the 
standardised  approach (which  is  the  simplest  of  the  three  broad approaches),  the  internal 
ratings based (IRB) foundation approach and the IRB advanced approach.7
Under the standardised approach, regulatory capital  requirements are more closely aligned 
and in harmony with the principal elements of banking risk – owing to the introduction of 
wider differentiated risk weights and a broader recognition of techniques which are applied in 
mitigating risk.8 
2 “Such a lack in high quality capital resulted in the raised levels of capitals and de leveraging of trading books 
(by many banks) amidst the Crisis.” See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank 
for International Settlements Publications, page 10 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
3 see ibid at page 11
4 ibid
5 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Standard Approach to Credit Risk, 
Supporting Document to the New Basel Accord at page 1 January 2001 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf>
6 ibid
7 ibid; see also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “The Internal Ratings Based 
Approach”  Supporting  Document  to  the  New Basel  Capital  Accord”  January  2001  Bank  for  International 
Settlements Publications <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf>
8 As a result, the standardised approach was intended to “generate capital ratios which were more aligned with 
the actual economic risks that banks are facing, compared to the 1988 Basel Accord – which should improve 
banks’ incentives to enhance their risk measurement and management capabilities and which should also reduce 
incentives for regulatory capital arbitrage.”
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Standard Approach to Credit 
Risk, Supporting Document to the New Basel Accord at page 1 January 2001 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf>
However problems with Basel II internal credit risk models (which relate to the fact such 
banks’  internal  credit  risk  models  were  overly  sensitive  in  their  implementation9 for  the 
calculation of regulatory capital, and generated pro cyclical effects) were realised during the 
recent Financial Crisis – as particularly exemplified by the case of Northern Rock.
One principal topic which various bodies and international standard setters have sought to 
address relates to the issue of the pro cyclical effects generated by Basel II. Consequences of 
the realisation of the need for further amendments to Basel II, include efforts which have been 
undertaken by the European Central Bank – as evidenced by its report, the Financial Stability 
Review. Measures which were proposed in its Review – as a means of addressing gaps in 
Basel  II,  include the  coupling of existing  regulatory framework with capital  insurance or 
liquidity insurance mechanisms.10
Further  measures  and  actions  which  have  been  taken  by  the  European  Central  Bank  in 
response to the steep decline of global financial activity, witnessed most prominently in the 
aftermath of Lehman Brothers, include:11
- The reduction of key interest rates to unprecedented low levels
- The  introduction  of  a  series  of  non standard  measures  aimed  at  supporting  credit 
provision by banks (to the Euro area economy). 
These non standard measures – referred to by the ECB as “enhanced credit support”, consist 
of five elements, namely:12 i) Extending the maximum maturity of refinancing operations (ii) 
Extending  the  eligible  collateral  list  (iii)  Provision  of  liquidity  in  foreign  currencies  (iv) 
Initiating  a  covered  bond  purchase  programme  (v)  Providing  unlimited  liquidity  in  all 
refinancing operations at a fixed rate.
Other  efforts  undertaken in response to the need to  address gaps inherent  in Basel  II  are 
reflected by the solutions and results generated and proposed by the Turner Review and the 
De Larosiere Report – such proposals and measures specifically being aimed at addressing 
and mitigating pro cyclical effects induced by Basel II.
As well as those proposals which have been put forward by the Basel Committee (on Banking 
Supervision) – such proposals being aimed at introducing counter cyclical buffers, and which 
comprise capital and/or provisions, the introduction of forward looking provisions has also 
been  supported  by  various  bodies  such  as  the  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  Council 
(ECOFIN).
In  view  of  its  acknowledgement  of  the  fact  that  tools  which  could  be  implemented  as 
measures for mitigating pro cyclicality exist beyond those measures proposed by the Basel 
Committee, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has taken up initiatives 
9 In their implementation to facilitate “the derivation of fundamental inputs for formulas which will determine 
the level of capital which large banks must retain.”
10 European Central Bank, “Is Basel II Pro Cyclical? A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability 
Review December 2009 at page 149 < http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/summary200912.en.html>
11 See G Tumpel-Gugerell, „ The ECB’s Actions During the Recent Financial Crisis and the Policy Elements 
Needed for a Sound Recovery.“ Speech at the Conference on “How Can the EU and China Contribute to a 
Sound and Sustainable Global Economic Recovery?” at the Shanghai Expo, Shanghai 3 July 2010 at page 2 of 5 
<http://www.bis.org/review/r100709e.pdf>
12 ibid
which are related to measures  such as dynamic  provisioning and supplementary measures 
which include leverage ratios.13
According to observations of the BIS,14 massive government support to re capitalise banks, to 
guarantee deposits and bank liabilities and to guarantee or buy the impaired assets of some of 
the largest financial institutions , arose from the inability of bank creditors and shareholders to 
distinguish between good and bad banks – which further resulted in the severe restriction of 
private sources of new capital.
„The enhanced Basel II framework (which includes reforms aimed at increasing the quantity 
of capital – as well as improving the quality of capital),and the macroprudential overlay are 
(together) referred to as Basel III. „15
Source : Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework, Bank for International 
Settlements Publications16
13 Committee of European Banking Supervisors, “Position Paper on a Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer” July 
2009 at page 2 < http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-778a4d20a880/CEBS-position-paper-
on-a-countercyclical-capital-b.aspx>
14 See ibid at page 10 of 26
15See infra note 16
16 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements 
Publications, page 9 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
Basel Committee’s Measures Aimed At Improving the Quality of Tier One Capital
Source: “Improving the Quality of Tier One Capital”17
C. Comparisons between Basel II and Basel III
Some differences which have been highlighted by the Basel III Compliance Professionals 
Association (BiiiCPA) relate to four main headings and are as follows:18
1) Tier One Capital
With Basel II, the Tier One capital ratio which banks were required to retain was 4%. Under 
Basel III this will be 6%. Moreover, whilst Basel II stipulated a Core Tier One capital ratio of 
2%, this will be 4.5% under Basel III and will comprise common equity before deductions. 
Such a 4.5% requirement will be phased in as follows:
Core Tier One capital ratio (common equity before deductions) before 2013: 2%
17 ibid at page 11 of 26
18 See Basel III Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA), „The Basel III Accord“ <http://www.basel-iii-
accord.com>
Before 1st January 2013 = 3.5%
Before 1st January 2014 = 4%
Before 1st January 2015 = 4.5%
In relation to both Basel II and III, the difference between the total capital requirement of 8% 
and the Tier One requirement can be achieved with Tier Two capital and other higher forms 
of capital.
2) Capital Conservation Buffer
Whilst no capital conservation buffer existed under Basel II, regulatory requirements under 
Basel III will require banks to retain a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% - as a means of 
“withstanding  future  periods  of  stress.”19 As  well  as  bringing  the  total  common  equity 
requirements  to  7%, such a move “reinforces  the stronger  definition  of capital  agreed by 
Governors and Heads of Supervision in July and the higher capital requirements for trading, 
derivative and securitisation activities to be introduced at the end of 2011.” 20
The capital  conservation buffer is  to  “sit  on top of Tier  One capital.”21 Any bank whose 
capital ratio fails to retain the stipulated limit (which is in excess of the buffer), faces the 
threat of “restrictions” from supervisors on payouts which include dividends, share buy backs 
and bonuses.22 
3) Counter cyclical Buffer
The purpose of the counter cyclical buffer is considered to be the achievement of “the broader 
macro prudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit 
growth.”  23 Further, the counter cyclical buffer is aimed at compelling banks to commence 
with build ups of such extra buffers - as soon as supervisors are aware of excessive credit in 
the system which subsequently pose a threat (in triggering loan losses).24 Banks are expected 
to “tap the buffer to offset such losses” without the immediate need to raise new capital.25
As is the case with the capital conservation buffer, counter cyclical buffers did not exist under 
Basel II. Basel III imposes a requirement of a counter cyclical buffer within a range of 0% 
19 The purpose of the conservation buffer being “to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used 
to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress. The closer banks’ regulatory capital ratios are 
to the minimum requirements, the greater the constraints on earnings distributions.” See Basel III Compliance 
Professionals Association (BiiiCPA), „The Basel III Accord : Capital Conservation Buffer “ <http://www.basel-
iii-accord.com>
20 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announce 
Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards” 12th September 2010 at page 1 of 7 
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf?noframes=1
21 See Reuters, “Finalized Basel III Bank Capital Ratios” September 2010 < 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68B26D20100912>
22 “The buffer is to comprise of common equity after the application of deductions like deferred taxes.” 
;ibid
23 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announce 
Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards” 12th September 2010 at page 2 of 7 
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf?noframes=1
24 See Reuters, “Finalized Basel III Bank Capital Ratios” September 2010 < 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68B26D20100912>
25 ibid
and  2.5% of  common  equity  or  “other  fully  loss  absorbing  capital  will  be  implemented 
according to national circumstances.”
4) Additional capital requirements for systemically relevant financial institutions
Another vital distinction between Basel II and Basel III is evident from the fact that under 
Basel  III,  “systemically  important  banks  will  be required  to  have loss absorbing capacity 
beyond the standards  approved and announced on the 12th September  2010 and work in 
relation  to  this  is  expected  to  continue  between  the  Financial  Stability  Board  (FSB)  and 
relevant  Basel  departments.”26 Furthermore,  the  Basel  Committee  and  the  FSB  are 
“developing a well integrated approach to systemically important financial institutions which 
could include a combination of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt.”27
Total Regulatory Capital for systemically important banks is therefore considered to be:28
[Tier One Capital Ratio] + [Capital Conservation Buffer] + [Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer] 
+ [capital for systemically important banks]
Furthermore,  measures aimed at  enhancing the level  of quality of capital  for systemically 
relevant  financial  institutions  are  evidenced  by  the  Basel  Committee’s  recent  efforts  to 
enhance loss absorbing capacity of capital on both going and gone concern basis.29
A further distinction between Basel II and Basel III relates to Basel II’s focus on internal 
controls.  The internal  ratings based approaches30 introduced under Basel II – as described 
under the first part of section B of this paper, were aimed at facilitating the ability of large 
banks to derive fundamental inputs for the formulas that will determine the level of capital 
they must  retain – this  also being achieved through an implementation of their individual 
credit risk models.31 Even though Basel II gives greater prominence to capital regulation (than 
its predecessor) – through its facilitation of the implementation of advanced and developed 
techniques such as the two internal ratings based (IRB) methodologies (the Foundational IRB 
and  the  Advanced  IRB  methodologies),  for  the  purposes  of  carrying  out  independent 
assessments of risk, its focus on internal models as a means of determining bank capitalisation 
is  to be contrasted with the recent efforts  aimed at  enhancing the quality and quantity of 
capital (under Basel III).
26 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announce 
Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards” 12th September 2010 at page 2 of 7 
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf?noframes=1
27 ibid
28 See Basel III Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA), „The Basel III Accord : Capital for 
Systemically Important Banks Only “ <http://www.basel-iii-accord.com>
29 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Proposal to Ensure the Loss 
Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non Viability” August 2010 < 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.htm.>
30 Which include the Foundational Internal Ratings Based (IRB) and the Advanced IRB methodologies
31 See D Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation (2008) Peterson Institute 
for International Economics at page 6 
Other components of the Basel III package which were approved in July 2010 relate to the 
definition of capital (including efforts aimed at improving the quantity and quality of capital), 
leverage ratio, risk coverage32 and liquidity.33 
According to the Basel Committee’s 2009 proposal on liquidity requirements, banks will be 
expected to meet the conditions imposed by two new liquidity requirements – a “short term 
requirement  referred  to  as  Liquidity  Coverage  Ratio  (LCR)  and a  long term requirement 
called the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSF).34
These first set of global minimum liquidity standards (since no such international standards 
currently exist), will be introduced on as from 1 January 2015 (with respect to the Liquidity 
Coverage  Ratio).  The  Liquidity  Coverage  Ratio  is  aimed  at  promoting  banks'  short-term 
resilience to potential liquidity disruptions.35
The Net Stable Funding Ratio, a “one year horizon” liquidity buffer” is to be tested and is 
expected to become mandatory as from January 2018.36 It serves the purpose of addressing the 
mismatches between the maturity of a bank’s assets and that of its liabilities.37 Such an effort 
to address challenges attributed to liquidity risk, if successfully implemented, would represent 
a huge step forward in rectifying some gaps which are inherent in Basel II.
Apart  from  the  all  important  issue  of  pro  cyclical  effects  generated  by  Basel  II,  other 
problems associated with Basel II will be discussed in the subsequent section.
D. Other Problems identified with Basel II
1) Its use of mathematical models
2) The fact that bank regulators do not have as much information (and particularly, risk-
sensitive information) as banks- hence facilitating a process whereby banks are able to 
manipulate bank ratings
Even  though  Basel  II  is  acknowledged  as  having  certain  elements  which  are  useful  – 
particularly “the support for a leverage ratio, a capital buffer and the proposal to address pro 
cyclicality through dynamic provisioning which is based on expected losses”, other problems 
associated with Basel II, as identified by Blundell-Wignall  and Atkinson (as well as these 
stated useful elements), include:38
32 “The proposals relating to risk coverage are aimed consolidating capital requirements for counter party credit 
exposures  arising from banks’  derivatives,  repo and securities  financing activities.”  See Reuters,  “Finalized 
Basel III Bank Capital Ratios” September 2010 < http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68B26D20100912>
33 ibid
34 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long Term Economic Impact of Stronger 
Capital and Liquidity Requirements” Bank for International Settlements Publications August 2010 at page 7
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf?noframes=1>
35ibid
36See  Reuters,  “Finalized  Basel  III  Bank  Capital  Ratios”  September  2010  < 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68B26D20100912>
37 ibid
38 A Blundell- Wignall and P Atkinson, “Thinking Beyond Basel III: Necessary Solutions for Capital and 
Liquidity” (OECD Journal Financial Market Trends, Volume 2010 Issue 1) at pages 4 – 7. For identified 
problems associated with Basel III, see page 2; ibid
a) The lack of a “concentration penalty” under Pillar One39
b) The lack of “country specific risks” under Pillar One
c) In relation to the above mentioned inherent flaw, that is, pro cyclicality,  the 
most basic reason attributed to this, in their opinion, stems from the fact that 
judgements tend to underestimate risks in good times and overestimate them in 
bad times.40
d) The subjective nature of risk inputs
e) Ambiguous and inconsistent definitions – largely attributed to the definition of 
capital.41
f) Under Pillars Two and Three respective identified problems include the fact 
that: Pillar Two is unlikely to be effective in a forward looking way and; that 
Pillar Three’s reliance on the notion that “disclosure and market discipline will 
penalise banks with poor risk management practices”, is likely to be inefficient 
since markets are not efficient.42
V. Conclusion
How far has Basel III gone in addressing :
I) The issues raised by Basel II 
Basel  III  has  made considerable  efforts  to  address  a  prominent  issue  raised  under  Basel, 
namely,  pro  cyclicality.  As  reflected  under  its  macro  prudential  outlay,43 Basel  III  has 
attempted  to  address  pro cyclicality  through measures  aimed  at  redressing “stability  over 
time.” Such measures include counter cyclical capital charges and forward looking provisions, 
capital  conservation  rules  for  stronger  capital  buffers  and  systemic  capital  surcharges  for 
systemically relevant financial institutions.
II) Problems which surfaced during the recent Financial Crisis
The recent Crisis highlighted the fact  that  banks which have been complying with capital 
adequacy requirements could still  face severe liquidity problems. From this perspective,  it 
would have been expected that greater focus would have been given to the issue of liquidity 
than is currently the case. It could be said that the Basel Committee has tried to appease the 
39 In this sense, they argue that “ minimum capital requirements associated with any loan due to credit risk, 
simply rise linearly with the holding of that asset type – regardless of the size of the exposure. This infers that 
Pillar One does not penalise portfolio concentration – concentration issues being left to supervisors under Pillar 
Two.” See ibid at page 4
40 More specific factors which were highlighted by Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson include:
• Leverage ratios being dependent on current market values. If asset values do not accurately 
reflect future cash flows, this increases the likelihood that pro cyclicality will occur
• The fact that banks’ risk measurement tend to be “point in time” and not based on an 
aggregate, holistic approach.See ibid at page 5
41 Identified points in relation to such inconsistency and ambiguity include i) Regulatory adjustments for 
goodwill not being mandated to apply to common equity – but applicable to Tier One and/or a combination of 
Tier One and Two ii) Regulatory adjustments not being applied uniformly across jurisdictions – thus paving the 
way for greater possibilities for regulatory arbitrage iii) Banks not providing clear and consistent data about their 
capital; see ibid 
42 ibid at page 7
43 Please refer to Table 3 “Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework” on page 5. 
needs and demands of various jurisdictions – in relation to those who had favoured tougher 
rules and those who had appealed for not too stringent rules.
III) “Too big to fail firms” and moral hazard 
As highlighted under section C of this paper, ongoing initiatives are taking place to develop a 
well  integrated  approach  to  systemically  important  financial  institutions  and  such  efforts 
could include a combination of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt.
IV) Need for longer transition period by certain banks
Whilst some elements of the recent announcements relating to the new framework (for Basel 
III) are considered by certain jurisdictions to be disappointing - owing to the fact that more 
stringent definitions for capital had been expected, the phase in periods have been welcomed 
by several jurisdictions.44 Countries like Germany  - where “silent participations”45 are relied 
on (particularly by public sector banks), have welcomed the phase in periods as this would 
allow for such extensively used “silent participations” to be included – as well as giving them 
more time to adjust. However, Landesbanks with joint stock corporate forms (who had sought 
longer transition periods), are particularly affected by the new Basel II rules since they will 
not to be able to include such “silent participations”46 as the highest quality form of capital 
from 2013.47
Are measures aimed at addressing liquidity timely enough? 
The need for an immediate increase in the quantity and quality of regulatory capital has not 
been advocated owing to the fact that “such an immediate goal for higher capital requirements 
would present risks in accentuating downturns.”48 The build up of counter cyclical buffers into 
capital  frameworks  and provisioning practices  is  considered by the Bank for International 
44 See iMarket News,“Basel Committee: Banks Need 7% Core Tier One Capital as of 2015” 
<http://imarketnews.com/node/19082>
45 “Silent participations consist of non-voting capital. They are common in Germany – even though they are rare 
abroad. Because silent participations do not absorb losses as long as a bank is still in business, it is excluded 
from core capital – hence triggering a difficult situation for banks seeking to raise other forms of capital. In 
particular,  public  sector  banks  have  relied  strongly  on  such  silent  participations  and  feared  competitive 
disadvantage as a result of the new requirements relating to Basel III. These funds at partly state-owned banks 
like NordLB [NDLG.UL] or Helaba (LHTGg.F) will still count as capital under some conditions, while those for 
joint  stock  companies  like  HSH  Nordbank  [HSH.UL]  and  eventually  LBBW  [LBBW.UL]  and  BayernLB 
[BAYLB.UL] will not.” See ibid and A Schuetze, “Only Landesbanks Complain as Germany Backs Basel III” 
September 13 2010 < http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE68C1FT20100913>
46 For  more  in  depth  information  on silent  participations,  see  C Sureth  and  A Halberstadt  „Shaping Profit 
Participation  Rights  and  Silent  Participation  as  Employee  Share  Ownership  from  a  Tax  and  Financial 
Perspective (Steuerliche und finanzwirtschaftliche Aspekte bei  der Gestaltung von Genussrechten und stillen 
Beteiligungen  als  Mitarbeiterkapitalbeteiligungen)“  June  2006  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=951155>
47  See A Schuetze, “Only Landesbanks Complain as Germany Backs Basel III” September 13 2010 < 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE68C1FT20100913>
48 See Bank for International Settlements, “Financial System and Macro economic Resilience: Revisited” (Eighth 
BIS Annual Conference 25-26 June 2009) BIS Papers No 53, September 2010 at page 31 < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap53.pdf>
Settlements as presenting a “key” challenge since this will help to ensure that reserves are 
built up during periods of growth – to facilitate its withdrawal during periods of economic 
stress.49 One way of achieving this , it is further argued, which is being explored by the Basel 
Committee, is through “the complement of strict minimum requirements that always hold, 
with, a long term target capital level to be achieved during periods of economic booms.”50
In  addressing  whether  the  measures  aimed  at  addressing liquidity  are  to  be  implemented 
immediately, consideration is to be had to the legal requirements which presently operate in 
several  jurisdictions  which  are  subject  to  Basel  II  and  III  requirements.  As  with  capital, 
consideration is to be had to the impact of limited transition periods (in the implementation of 
such rules). Whilst  the implementation of measures aimed at addressing liquidity risks, is 
without  doubt,  of  immense significance and importance,  certain  banks could be placed at 
greater  disadvantage  (than  other  banks)  if  not  given  sufficient  time  to  facilitate  the 
implementation of such liquidity rules. 
49 see ibid
50 Transition between the two phases, it is further argued, would introduce a counter cyclical element whose 
adjustment  mechanism can  be  readily  designed  in  a  way that  is  compatible  with  banks’  incentives  –  such 
compatibility  being  achieved  through  the  imposition  of  limits  on  dividends,  share  buy  backs  and  other 
distributions to shareowners : as long as capital coverage is below the target level; ibid
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
“Annex 2: Phase-in arrangements”51
51 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announce 
Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards” 12th September 2010 at page 7 of 7
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